The weakest link in military operations is rarely a weapon or sensor. It is energy. After all, what happens to command, air defence and logistics if the power goes out or the fuel supply is disrupted?

At a time when infrastructure is a target and energy needs are rising, energy supply becomes a strategic issue, argue Joachim Friedericy, Salomo van der Heijden and Tjerk Kuipers of the Ministry of Defence in this piece for The Engineer. They see daily how energy security affects the deployability and protection of personnel and equipment.

Foreign missions and expeditions traditionally lean heavily on fuel transports. That model is logistically heavy and tactically vulnerable. According to calculations by the US Engineer Research and Development Center, a Forward Operating Base (a semi-permanent military support base close to the front) consumes 6.5 to 9 litres of generator fuel per person per day. NATO airbase Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan required 60 megawatts of power modules in 2016. In addition, each additional transport movement creates an opportunity to be attacked and risks for personnel.

At the same time, power demand has changed due to modern systems. Consider, for example, the hundred-kilowatt High Energy Laser (HEL) from the firm Electro Optic Systems (EOS), which can take out swarms of drones and which Defence may rely on from 2028. Or to the Epirus Leonidas, a microwave gun against drones. Those kinds of systems require not just peak power, but continuous power.

Momentum

Nuclear power - especially small modular reactors (SMRs) and micro-reactors - therefore deserves a different framing than 'a resource alongside solar and wind'. For Defence, it is primarily about baseload power on site, with predictability and autonomy. The coalition agreement offers a remarkable opening for this. It states: 'We are strengthening the nuclear cluster in the Netherlands, accelerating the SMR programme and supporting maritime nuclear innovations.' That last phrase also opens the door to military applications. Think nuclear-powered ships like shipbuilder AllSeas is developing, SMRs for Defence sites and mobile microreactors for operational deployment in deployments or calamities.

Yet the focus in the coalition agreement remains on civilian energy supply: at least four new nuclear power plants, conventional and modular. The question is whether Defence will include this acceleration in, for instance, the new Defence Paper, or once again fall behind the times - as it did in 2024.

Three recommendations

The Defence Paper 2024 'Strong, smart and together' pays attention to sustainability and materials needs, but treats energy primarily as a facility issue. Energy security - the ability to remain operational under all circumstances - does not feature as a strategic need. This is a blind spot. To the drafters of upcoming policy papers, we therefore have three concrete recommendations:

- Position energy security as a strategic need.

Not as part of climate goals, but as an operational precondition alongside ammunition, fuel and intelligence. Formulate clear requirements: how many days should a unit be able to operate autonomously without external supply? What peak power is needed for future weapon systems?

- Anticipate NATO developments.

The US Project Pele has been testing mobile micro-nuclear reactors since 2016, and is now in the realisation/testing phase at Idaho National Laboratory. The TRISOHALEU fuel has been delivered, assembly and testing are scheduled for 2026. The equally US Project Janus is in the programme and site selection phase. Candidate sites have been identified, with first-base deployment targeted around 2028.

If the Netherlands does not soon develop a policy framework for nuclear energy supply in a military context, we will soon have no voice in NATO standardisation. This affects interoperability (the ability of different systems or devices to cooperate and communicate effectively) and the safety of our own personnel.

- Link SMR development to defence policy.

The coalition agreement invests in the nuclear cluster. Make that a defence component: develop joint review frameworks, certification and personnel expertise. This avoids duplication and creates economies of scale for both civilian and military applications

Energy is employability

If the Netherlands is serious about resilience, we will have to make an explicit choice. Do we treat energy as facility support or operational capacity? If energy is 'facility support', we optimise on cost. If energy is a required capability, we design for redundancy and (cyber)resilience. That difference determines whether Defence units and critical infrastructure continue to function at the time of conflict situations or not.

Defence was still buying 132 million litres of fuel in 2020. The Defence Sustainability Implementation Agenda aims for 30 per cent reduction of fossil dependence by 2030 and 50 per cent self-sufficient encampments. This agenda was drafted from a sustainability perspective, with energy supply as a facility, and even then the gap cannot be bridged without nuclear power.

The coalition agreement creates momentum for SMRs, micro-reactors and maritime nuclear innovations. Defence should use this to position energy security as a strategic need, to avoid finding in five years' time that allies have surpassed us operationally.

For policymakers: include energy security as a strategic theme in upcoming policy papers. If we do not structure this conversation now, crisis and time constraints will soon do it for us.

Text: Joachim Friedericy, Salomo van der Heijden and Tjerk Kuipers, working at the Ministry of Defence and indirectly involved in nuclear energy supply within Defence.
Photo: Preparing transport of Project Pele's small reactor in US Utah. Credit: ProjectPele